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SAN'rA. PE Tl~A!\SPOH'l'A'l'JON COMPANY (a Corpora-
tion), Hcspondent, v. STA'l'E BOAHD OF' EQUAI.JTZA-
T I OX, Appellant. 
[1] Automobile Stages- Licenses- Activities Taxable- Exemp-
tions.···Und(•r Hev. & Tax. Code, § 9653 (part of 11otor Ve-
hidc Transportation License Tax Law), deelnring that the tax 
does not npply where the transportation of property is wholly 
within or between incorporated eitiPs "wlH•re no portion of 
the pub lie high way outside the eorporate limits of the eitics 
or private property is traversed in such operation," it was 
the legislative intent that the exemption should apply only 
where entirely intracity operations were concerned, and the 
intracity pickup and delivery operations of a railroad sub-
sidiary, conducting both a highway carrier business and a city 
earrier business, were not exempt from the gross receipts tax 
imposed by the statute where its intracity pickup and delivery 
service was so intermingled with as to he an inseparable part 
of its intercity scrvrce. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. \Yalter II. Odemar, Judge. Heversed. 
Action by highway common carrier to recover taxes paid 
under protest. ,Judgment for plaintiff reversed. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, James E. Sabine, 
Assistant Attorney General, Dan Kaufmann, James C. Mau-
pin and Jay L. Shavelson, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Appellant. 
Robert \V. \Yalker and Robert B. Curtiss for Hespondent. 
CAR/l'ER, ,I.-Plaintiff, Santa Fe Transportation Com-
pany, a corporation, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, or the 
transportation company, brought this action against the State 
Board of Equalization for a refund of taxes paid under pro-
test.1 
See Cal.Jur.2d, Motor Transportation, § 49 et seq. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Automobile Stages, § 2. 
1 The tax assessed encompassed the periorl from N ovemher 1, 1950 
until October 31, 1953. Defendant refundell to plaintiff a penalty 
customer's warehouse 
of such and the customer's ware~ 
house or of business to sm h local of 
on bills of lading of the company which were 
either theretofore or thereafter the 
under the same bills of of the company from 
one station to another over public highways outside the cor-
porate limits of cities. The railroad bills of lading required 
the railroad to make pickups and to deliver the from 
the point of origin to the of destination. 
Plaintiff's pickup and services were, for the most 
part, accomplished by the use of equipment than the 
"line haul" which, for the most part, 
used heavier equipment. It is conceded the plaintiff that 
in 8.8 per cent of the operations line haul equipment was 
used for pickup and services whereas in 91.2 per cent 
of the operations the line haul equipment was used in the 
intercity operations. In some instances the lighter equip-
ment was used in operations. 
The tax here disputed was assessed by defendant Board 
of Equalization under the provisions of the California Motor 
Vehicle Transportation License Tax Law (Hev. & Tax. Code, 
§§ 9601-9607, 9651, 9652 et seq.). 
Section subdivision , defines "operator" as ".Any 
person engaging in the transportation of persons or property 
for hire or compensation by or upon a motor vehicle upon any 
public highway in this State, either directly or indirectly." 
Section 9606 defines ''Gross '' as follows: '' 'Gross 
receipts' inclnde all from the operation of motor 
vehicles entirely within this State and a proportion, based 
npon the proportion of the mileage within this State to the 
assessed by it and paid by plaintiff, and it has been stipulated between 
the parties that the correct amount to which plaintiff would be en· 
titled is the sum of $33,244.38 which includes $4,958.07 interest. 
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that: ''For the purpose of the proper 
part and to preYent eYasion of the tax 
that the gross f1·om aU 
of operators are 
lished. '' 
to the tax until the 
Section 9651 that: ''A tax is hereby im-
upon operators at the rate of 3 per cent of the gross 
of the operators from operations." 
Section 9653 that: '' 'rhis part does not apply to 
public 
traversed in such 
''The tax does not 
the 
vehicles within 
between cities or incor-
property where no portion of the 








plaintiff's that its intracity pidmp and de-
]iyery even though admittedly part of its intercity 
was separate and distinct from its line haul operatiom; 
and thus within the emphasized of the exemption stat-
ute s0t forth. It is argued that the pickup and 
service is "wholly" within incorporated cities and 
not over public higlnva,Ys. Defendant, on the other hand, 
conieuds that aml serviee 
wa,; an 
There is no as to the fad;;;. arise" over 
what effect is to he them. Plaintiff's books were 
2 This section wns mucnrled in 1!155 l>y the a<J,lition of another para-
graph \Yhidt will he hercinnftcr discussed. 
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kept by an employee of the railway company and were segre-
gated as to pickup and delivery service and line haul opera-
tions. There was no segregation when line haul equipment 
was used for pickup and delivery service and no segregation 
when the lighter equipment was used for intercity service. 
The price charged for pickup and delivery service was 25% 
cents per 100 pounds, while the line haul charge was on a 
cost plus percentage basis. 'fhe drivers of the line haul equip-
ment and pickup and delivery service equipment were mem-
bers of different unions, however, as heretofore noted, both 
types of equipment V>ere operated to some extent on an inter-
changeable basis. All equipment was serviced at the same 
garage. In some 21 cities, pickup and delivery service was 
accomplished by equipment other than that owned by the 
transportation company. Plaintiff transportation company 
held a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the 
Public Utilities Commission which authorized it to do both 
an intercity and an intracity business and which authorized 
it to move on billing of the railway company at its published 
tariff rates. Plaintiff was also separately licensed as a city 
carrier. 
Plaintiff relies upon the case of Califo1·nia ·Motor etc. Co. v. 
State Board of Eq~talization (1947), 31 Cal.2d 217 [187 P.2d 
7 45], in support of its position that its intracity pickup and 
delivery service was a separate and untaxable part of its 
business. Defendant board relies on the case of Bekins Van 
Lines, Inc. v. Johnson (1942), 21 Cal.2d 135 [130 P.2d 421], 
in support of its position that the intracity pickup and de-
livery service was an inseparable and taxable part of plain-
tiff's intercity operations. 
In the California Motor case it was held that the intercity 
and intracity operations of the plaintiff were so entirely 
separate and distinct as to constitute two separate businesses. 
In the California Motor case the plaintiff was a highway 
common carrier which operated under a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity restricted to intercity operations 
and which prohibited it from operating any intracity pickup 
and delivery service in any of the three cities which were part 
of its intercity operations. Plaintiff purchased the equipment 
of the pickup and delivery service in Los Angeles which had 
formerly been nsPd by it for its intracity service; it also pur-
chased the equipment of tlJC Oakland and San Francisco pick-
up and delivery service. Plaintiff, after acquiring a license 
as a city carrier, operated the I~os Angeles and Oakland 
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and delivery and the former owner of the 
raneisl:o pickup and delivery service continued to oper-
ate it for the plaintiff. Plaintiff operated its pickup and de-
livery services under written contracts with the express com-
pany which covered only that portion of the goods transported 
in intracity movement. There were also separate written con-
tracts covering the intercity and interterminal transportation. 
It was found by the trial court that different equipment was 
used for the inter- and intracity services; that '' 'its equip-
ment never deviated from its devotion to the service for which 
it was licensed. It kept accounts restricted to its character 
as a highway carrier. . .. That plaintiff is both a highway 
carrier and a city carrier and it exists in each of these char-
acters by separate authority. Each business [of plaintiff] has 
a separate license or certificate. . . . The businesses were not 
confused or entangled and did not overlap. The Court finds 
that the two operations, that of a city carrier and that of a 
highway carrier, are just as separate and distinct for all pur-
poses of this case as if the two operations had been conducted 
by separate and distinct corporations or legal entities.' '' It 
was also there found that " 'plaintiff has at all times kept 
separate and distinct books and records covering said pickup 
and delivery service and entirely independent of books and 
records covering its intercity operations.' '' 
In the Bekins Van case (which was decided in 1942 but 
which involved taxes assessed for the years 1935 and 1936 
under the provisions of the California :Motor Vehicle Trans-
portation License Tax Act), it was held that intracity pickup 
and delivery service which was maintained for the transporta-
tion of small consignments to and from intercity terminals 
was taxable as part of the gross receipts. 'rhis court then 
stated that : ''The trial court in the present case properly 
eoncluded that receipts from all hauls which originated in one 
city for transportation over the public highways or which 
terminated in a city after such transportation should be 
treated without distinction as taxable gross receipts from oper-
ation. 
"It is shown that receipts from intra-city business as ex-
cepted from the act were not included in the computations 
of gross receiptr.; from operation as defined by the act. Nor 
were charges for labor furnished for the purpose of packing 
and crating goods, or warehousing, included in the gross 
receipts subject to ta:s:ation. All exceptions and limitations 




of this eourt dis<· 






The situation in that casr, howeyer, docs 
not coincide with that now before us. There was not proven 
and found by the court, as that the plaintiff conducted 
two separate and distinct business operations, each of which 
performed distinct and different services nuder contracts 
separately executed <with the of the services. Hather, 
the plaintiff there argued that before the tax rate was applied, 
it was entitled to dednct from its gross for the hauling 
of goods from its customers' dwellings in one to those in 
other cities an amount computed as attributable to services 
rendered in loading and unloading such between house 
and sidewalk, as well as amounts ' indicatecl on ·its 
waybills receivul and within 
' In its opinion this court 139 
of 21 Cal.2d), 'In intercity hauls of smali the 
plaintiff found it more convenient to up and deliver with 
the use of smaller trucks between the point of pick-up or 
delivery and the larger truck or van which was to transport 
or wl1ieh had transported the over the public highways. 
In other hauls, the van or truck received and dis-
cha1·gccl the load directly at the door. The plaintiff contends 
that from such separate pickup and service 
within municipalities in connection with intercity hauls should 
be excepted from assessnwnt under the act beeause that service 
is conducted entirely within municipalities and does not em-
ploy any of the public higlnvays.' ... 
"It is to be noted, also, that the court in its opinion in the 
above-cited case points out 142 of 21 Cal.2d) that 'receipts 
from intra-city businesR as from tile act [Hev. & Tax. 
Code, § 9653] 1vere not included [by the Board of Equaliza-
tion] in the computation of gross receipts from operation as 
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defined by the act. Nor were charges for labor furnished for 
the purpose of packing and crating goods, or ·warehousing, 
included in the gross receipts subject to taxation,' and that 
138) in its return to the board for the years in question 
'the plaintiff reported its gross receipts from all transporta-
tion business in the state exclusive of hauls excepted section 
14 § of the act,' but claimed deductions therefrom 
as described aboYe. It thus appears that only receipts 
those scr·viccs which were found to be ·integral parts of the 
of goods from a dwelling, over the 
destirwtion ontsidc of the city in 
originated, were held subject to 
the tax. By plaintiff in the instant case is not moving 
the goods of its own customers in intercity operations whereof 
the pickup and delivery service forms an integral part of a 
unitary operation, but is rather, as found by the trial court, 
engaging in two separate and distinct businesses, severally 
authorized by a certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity and by a permit to operate as a city carrier, in which it 
renders to an express company, which alone deals with the 
general public, separate services under separate contracts and 
with separate and independent bills rendered therefor. Mani-
festly, the fact that the same goods were the subjects of both 
intracity and intercity transportation does not establish that 
as a matter ol' law there was but a single business operation. 
In truth, the plaintiff in its capaeity of highway carrier was, 
as previously noted, prohibited from rendering pickup and 
delivery service in any of its terminal depot eities and, hence, 
could carry intercity only the identical goods which were the 
subject of pickup and deliYery by some other operation or 
agency." (Emphasis added.) 
A comparison of the facts of the case at bar with the distinc-
tions above drawn shows: That plaintiff carried goods for its 
parent company, the railway company, on the railway's bills 
of lading; that while plaintiff had two certificates, one of which 
was an intracity license, its certificate of public convenience 
and necessity was not prohibitory but im~luded the right to 
c·onduet intr~wity transportation; that piekup and delivery 
t-Jerviee and intercity operations were rendered under separate 
c:ontracts although it appear:-; that tbe original 1937 contract 
covered intrac-.ity pidmps and deliveriPs as well as line hauls; 
that while no separate hills were rendered for the two services, 
different ehargec; were made for intra- and intereity opera-
tions; that pickup and delivery charges were registered by the 
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railway and forwarded to the plaintiff which kept 
monthly summaries and payment was remitted monthly by the 
agents; that while bookkeeping was segregated on the basis of 
pickup and delivery and line haul operations, there was some 
intermingling and overlapping both as to the bookkeeping and 
the operations themselves in that no distinction was made as to 
wholly intracity pickups and deliveries. 
In the Bekins case it was held to be of no significance that 
plaintiff there used smaller equipment for pickup and de-
livery as a matter of its owu convenience. In the California 
Motor case it was held to be of great significance that there 
was no overlapping or intermingling of the use of the two 
types of vehicles and that there was separate billing and a 
complete separation of the intra- and intercity accounts as 
a matter of bookkeeping. It was also held significant in the 
California Motor case that while the pickup and delivery serv-
ices were owned by the intercity transportation company, both 
businesses were conducted on behalf of an independent third 
party-the express company. Factually, the case at bar ap-
pears more like the Bekins case than it does the California 
Motor case. The Bekins case was not overruled by the Cali-
fornia Motor case but was distinguished only because of the 
factual differences existing in the two cases. 
[1] Plaintiff argues that there is nothing in section 9653 
to indieate a legislative intention that a transportation op-
eration was exempt from taxation only if it is entirely sep-
arated from or in no way related to another transportation 
which is conducted on high·ways outside the city limits. The 
answer to this contention lies in the wording of the statute 
in which it is provided that the tax does not apply where the 
transportation of property is wholly within or between in-
corporated cities "where ·no porNon of the p~tblie highway 
outside the corporate limits of the cities or private property 
is traversed in such operation." (Emphasis added.) A ma-
jority of this court said in the Bekins case (21 Cal.2d at 
pp. 140, 141) that "'fhe preparatory activities sought to be 
excepted are just as much a part of and essential to transporta-
tion, and therefore to operation of motor vehieles, as are 
actual loading and unloading operations whieh are also pre-
paratory to the rolling of the vehicle along the highways. To 
adopt the plaintiff's suggestion would be to add to the lan-
guage of the definition a limitation which the Legislature did 
not express and which it must be deemed it did not intend. 
If the Legislature intended to exclude from 'operation' as 
Peb. FE TR.\XSP. v. 
defined every ineidrntal 
essential in the mattrr of 
and hire, it could havr 
such 1 imiting 1vords the Lrgislature 
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of not so limiting or circumscribing the meaning or scope of 
the act. (In 1"e Bush, 6 Cal.2d 4-3 P.2d 511].) Under the 
applicable rules oi' construction this court may not supply 
any language which the Legislature must be deemed to have 
omitted intentionally.'' 
Plaintiff also contends that the Bckins ease was de-
cided on facts occurring prior to the 1939 amendment to the 
act which, it is argued, constituted a substantive ehangc in 
the law. 'l'his same contention was made with respect to the 
1941 codification of what is nmv scctioll 96:33 in San Diego etc. 
Ry. Co. v. Stale Board of Equalization (1948), 89 Cal.App.2d 
267,270 [200 P.2d 573], where the court said: "\Vc find no 
merit in this contention. No change in the language of the 
statutes has been mactc which compels such eonelnsion; and 
if the Legislature intended, by the slight changes made in 
the wording of the law, that in determining gross receipts 
subject to taxation, only that portion of a single fare attribut-
able to transportation in unincorporated territory should be 
taxed, no reason appears why cryptic language should have 
been used. \Vhcrc prorationing has been intended, as pro-
vided in section 9606, snpra, the Legislature has so provided 
in definite terms; and its failure to provide for the apportion-
ment oi' gross reeeipts from intcr-eity travel on a mih'age 
basis, when it specifieally so provided regarding interstate 
travel, is convincing evidence that no such result "\Yas intended. 
It is beyond the province of conrts to read into seetion 9653, 
sttpra, language which, we must assume, was intentionally 
omitted. Purthermore, that the~ Legislature did not intend 
to provide for prorationing as claimed is indicated by section 
9652, supra. Also section 9653 is an exemption statute, and 
as such is subjeet to the rule that exemptions from taxation 
are to be strictly construed against the taxpayer. (Cypress 
Lawn Cemetery Assn. Y. San Froncisco, ~11 Cal. 887, 3!30 
[295 P. 818] ; Bay Cities Tmnsp. Co. v. Johnson, 8 Cal.2d 
706, 712 [68 P.2d 710]; Miller v. McColgan, 17 Cal.2d 432, 
441-442 [110 P.2d 419, 184 A.L.R. 1424] ; Robertson v. John-
son, 55 Cal.App.2d 610, 614 [1:n P.2d 388].)" Plaintiff's 
argument that the court in the San Diego case was referring 
to the 1941 codification, rather than the 1939 amendment, is 
without merit. The court was referring specifically to the 
340 STATE BOARD OF 
apparont fcon1 its c·otu·lusion '' 
our conclusion is that the (keisimm in In rc Bush and Bek'ins 
Van supra, ar(; applicable and eoni rolling 
in this ease." The 1941 t•odifieai ion of what is llOW sed ion 
9653 divided the scetion into two parts, changed a (:omma to 
a and substituted the word "does" for the phrase 
'' hereunder shall.'' 
It should be noted that while the trial court made findings 
which are in accord with the facts heretofore set forth, it 
concluded that defendant was not entitled to assess the tax 
because it was levied on "gross from the transporta-
tion of goods in operations wholly within the limits of in-
corporated dties or between incorporated cities where no 
portion of the public hig1nvay outside the c-orporate limits 
of such eities were trayersed. . . . '' 
It appears to us that the wording of the statute is 
significant and that the r~egislature undoubtedly intended 
that the exemption should apply only where entirely intra-
city operations were concerned. It, of course, cannot be de-
nied that in the California Motor case the pickup and delivery 
service while intracity was incidental to the intercity op-
erations of the plaintiff there as it was in the Bekins case. 
There is, of course, in the Dekins case and the one under 
consideration an intermingling of operations which was not 
present in the California Motor case although the same com-
pany conducted both types of operations in all three cases. 
In view of the holding in the San Diego case heretofore set 
forth which involved intra- and extra-city transportation of 
passengers, the amendment to section 9653 by the addition 
of subsection (c) in 1955 is interesting. It is there provided 
that "If any incorporated city imposes any tax or any fran-
chise or license fee measured by the gross receipts derived 
from the transportation of passengers and any operator en-
aagecl in the transportation of passengers partly within ancl 
partly without the city, the tax imposed by this part cloes 
not apply to the por·tion of the gross receipts attributable to 
operations within the city and inclttclecl in the measure of the 
city tax or fee. The amount of gross receipts to which the 
tax does not apply under this subdivision shall not exceed the 
proportion of the operator's gross receipts that the mileage 
operated within the city bears t() the entire mileage over which 
the operations extend." (Emphasis added.) By the addi-
tion of this subsection the Legislature provided for a pro-
rationing of gross receipts where intra- and extra-city pas-
Feb.1959] HOTLE v. MILLER 
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senger service was involved. No similar provision has been 
enacted to take care of the intra- and extra-city transporta-
tion of property. In the absence of such legislation, and 
under the section as it now stands, we do not see how intra-
city operations which are an inseparable part of intercity 
can be considered exempt from the gross receipts 
tax. 
The is reversed. 
Gibson, C. Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would affirm the judgment for 
the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Patrosso in the opinion 
prepared by him for the District Court of Appeal in Santa 
Fe Transportation Co. v. State Board of Equalization (Cal. 
App.), 328 P.2d 990. 
Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied March 4, 
1959. Shenk, .T., Schauer, .J., and McComb, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
[Sac. No. 6819. In Bank. Feb. 6, 1959.] 
HAROLD L. HOTLE et al., as Executors, etc., Appellants, v. 
EVELYN P. lVIILLER, as Special Administrator, etc., 
Respondent. 
[1] Reformation of Instruments-Pleading.-A complaint by exe-
cutors of a will alleging that on a designated date testatrix 
and her husband opened a joint tenancy bank account, that 
on another date more than 12 years later the spouses orally 
agreed that, regardless of how title was held, all their property 
had been acquired as community property and that "all of 
said property, and any and all property which they might 
thereafter acquire, should be held and owned by them as com-
munity property regardless of the ·way the record title might 
stand at any time," that they employed an attorney to draft 
the written instrument, which they executed in the mistaken 
belief that it correctly expressed their oral understanding, but 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Reformation of Instruments, § 35; 
[2, 3, 6, 7, 9] Banks, § 85(1); [4] Evidence, § 327; [5] Evidence, 
§ 381; [8] Husband and Wife, § 159. 
